A background image of a waterfall cascading over rocks, with a teal and yellow decorative border at the bottom.

Utility Investment in Demand-Side Resources

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Creating an Environment Which Supports Demand-Side Investment

1. Program Investment Cost Recovery
2. Recovery of Authorized Fixed-Costs
3. Performance-Based DSM Incentive

✓ Energy Efficiency Rider

Energy Efficiency Rider

- Schedule 91 in Idaho & Oregon
 - 1.5% of base revenue
 - Monthly caps
 - Residential customers – \$1.75/meter/mo.
 - Irrigation customers - \$50.00/meter/mo.
 - Approximately \$8.5 million in funding annually

✓ **Fixed-Cost Adjustment**
True-Up Mechanism
(Decoupling)

Ratemaking Basics

- Revenue Requirement = Expenses + Return on Rate Base
 - Expenses = Fuel + Other Variable Costs + Fixed Costs
 - Fixed Costs = Fixed Operating Costs + Depreciation + Taxes + Interest
- Rate Design
 - Energy, Demand, and Service Charges by Rate Class

The Nature of the Problem

- Fixed costs recovered through volumetric rates (Energy Charge)
- Rates based upon assumed level of energy sales (Test Year)
- If energy sales are less than expected, fixed costs are not recovered
- If energy sales exceed assumptions, shareholders benefit

NEVERTHELESS...

The Nature of the Problem

EVERY reduction in energy sales yields
a corresponding reduction in the utility's fixed cost
recovery!

CONCLUSION

Without a true-up mechanism, every reduced kWh
is a detriment to the Company's shareholders.

Decoupling Has Two Parts

1. First Decouple:

- Sever link between revenues and energy sales

2. Then Recouple:


- Must link revenue recovery to something else:
 - Number of customers
 - Inflation
 - Determinants of fixed costs (cost of capital, labor rates, etc)
 - Forecasts of billing determinants
 - Other

Classes Differ Substantially


(5 classes account for 99% of revenue)

	% of customers	% of energy
Residential (1)	84	38
Small general (7)	8	2
Large general (9)	4	28
Large Power (19)	0	18
Irrigation (24)	3	14

Percentage of Revenue Requirement



Percentage of Fixed Costs from Variable Charges



Basics of True-up Mechanism

- Bill customers under current tariffs to determine **ACTUAL** fixed cost recovery (existing service, demand, and energy charges)
- Calculate **ALLOWED** fixed cost recovery using the true-up mechanism (based on \$/customer)
- Put differences between **ACTUAL** and **ALLOWED** fixed cost recovery in a balancing account
- Refund (surcharge) amount in balancing account the following year

FCA Formula

$$\text{FCA} = \underbrace{(\text{CUST} \times \text{FCC})}_{\text{Allowed Fixed Cost Recovery}} - \underbrace{(\text{NORM} \times \text{FCE})}_{\text{Actual Fixed Cost Recovery}}$$

Where:

FCA = Fixed Cost Adjustment;

CUST = Actual number of customers, by class;

FCC = Fixed Cost per Customer, by class;

NORM = Weather-normalized energy, by class;

FCE = Fixed Cost per Energy, by class.

Fixed Cost Adjustment

- IPUC Docket No. IPC-E-04-15 – Order No. 30267
 - Adopted FCA Stipulation as agreed upon
 - 3-year pilot – January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2009
 - Residential and Small Commercial Classes
 - First rate adjustment – June 1, 2008
 - 3% cap on annual increases
 - Close monitoring by Commission Staff and other interested parties
 - Either Staff or Company can request discontinuance of pilot
 - Company expected to demonstrate enhanced commitment to energy efficiency and DSM

- ✓ **Performance-Based
DSM Incentive Pilot**

What is a Performance-Based DSM Incentive?

- A “Performance-Based DSM Incentive” is a mechanism designed to reward the company for performance above its DSM program goals and impose a penalty for performance below agreed-upon levels.

Background

- Parties to the Fixed-Cost Adjustment (FCA) case recommended that IPCo implement a performance-based DSM pilot to operate in parallel to the FCA.
- IPCo developed a performance-based mechanism with input from the Idaho Commission Staff and FCA parties.
- Pilot was filed with the IPUC Dec. 18, 2006 (Case No. IPC-E-06-32).
- Commission issued Order No. 30268 authorizing the implementation of the pilot over a 3-year period (2007 – 2009).

Why Implement a Performance-Based Incentive Pilot?

- FCA removes a financial disincentive to DSM acquisition; performance-based mechanism creates an incentive.
- A pilot allows for testing of the mechanism on a limited basis.
- Experience with the pilot may lead to a performance-based incentive program that can be applied to the company's entire DSM portfolio.

Pilot Structure

- ENERGY STAR® Homes Northwest is the DSM program being tested under the Pilot.
- IPCo will earn an incentive when the program exceeds its market-share goal (7% in 2007, 9.8% in 2008 & 11.7% in 2009¹).
- IPCo will incur a penalty when the program does not reach at least the market-share achieved in 2006 (expected to be 4.9%).
- IPCo will not earn an incentive or incur a penalty for program performance between the goal level and the penalty level.

1. NEEA's regional goal for utility-funded ENERGY STAR Homes 2007 - 2009.

Incentive Mechanism

- Incentive will be calculated as a share of the present value net benefits resulting from the program.
- IPCo can earn up to a 10% share of PV net benefits using a sliding scale approach.
 - For example, the incentive would be 1% of net benefits for achieving 101% of the goal, 2% for 102%, etc. The incentive will be capped at 10% of net benefits.
- Simulated incentive amounts under the pilot range from \$ 5,000 to \$120,000.

Penalty Structure

- Penalty will be calculated as a fixed 50% share of the “lost” net benefits resulting from an unsatisfactory performance level.
 - For example, if the program achieves a 2.5% market-share level in 2007 resulting in net benefits of \$100,000 and the net benefits at 4.9% market-share threshold are equal to \$150,000, the penalty amount would be \$25,000 or 50% of the difference in net benefits.
- Simulated penalty amounts under the pilot range from \$ 5,000 to \$120,000.

Implementation

- Program performance will be evaluated annually to determine the market-share achievement².
- IPCo will submit performance results each year to the IPUC by March 15.
- Any incentive or penalty will be applied to customers' bills through an energy-based rate or credit under the Conservation Charge line item for presentation purposes.

2. Total housing starts will be determined based on the number building permits issued in IPCO's service area as reported by Wells Fargo Bank Idaho Construction Report.

Questions...Answers...Comments

